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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-COMMERCE CLAUSE-LOCAL SMOKE CONTROL ORDINANCE NoT AN UNDUE BURDEN ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE-In accordance
with a scheme of federal ship inspection,! appellant possessed certificates
which permitted its ships to operate on the Great Lakes2 and which specified
the type of boiler which might be used. While two of its ships were docked in
Detroit, smoke was emitted from their boilers in violation of the minimum
density and duration requirements of the Detroit Smoke Abatement Code.3

1 REv. STAT. §§ 4399-462 (1875), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 390-416, ~35-36 (1958).
2 REv. STAT. § 4321 (1875), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 263 (1953).
3 DETROIT, MICH., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 184 (1954).
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The equipment which appellant was then using made compliance with the
ordinance impossible. When criminal proceedings were instituted against
appellant, it brought an action to enjoin the City of Detroit from enforcing
the ordinance on the theory that the regulation placed an unconstitutional
burden on interstate commerce.4 The lower court denied the injunction
and was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Michigan.5 On appeal to the
United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed, two Justices dissenting.6 A
state police power regulation which neither discriminates against interstate
commerce nor disrupts a national policy of uniform regulation is constitutional. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
The constitutionality of a state police power regulation affecting interstate commerce should be grounded on an assessment of the functional
interests raised by the facts of the particular case. In the principal case,
however, the Court disposed of the commerce clause question by reference
to formal, conceptual statements of law'T and gave no indication that it had
considered such functional factors as the effect of the ordinance upon the
flow of commerce, the effectiveness of the regulation in eliminating the
evil to be controlled, or the character of the business being regulated.8
In other cases the Court has adopted a more active role by expressly weighing state and national interests, by appearing to inquire into the wisdom
and effectiveness of the legislation, and by otherwise discussing the functional aspects of the case in its written opinion.9 However, it is likely that
in determining the constitutionality of a state regulation affecting interstate commerce the Court always considers the functional aspects of the
case,10 but only in some cases does it do so expressly in its written opinion.H
4 Appellant also argued that Congress had pre-empted the field through a scheme of
federal ship inspection and that the possession of a federal license to operate precluded
state regulation. Both the Michigan Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court
rejected these contentions. For a discussion of these aspects of the case, see The Supreme
Court, 1959 Term, 74 HARv. L. REv. 132 (1960).
5 Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 355 Mich. 227 (1959).
6 Justices Douglas and Frankfurter dissented. They based their dissent on the preemption issue and argued that the requirements of the Detroit smoke ordinance were in
conflict with the federal statute.
1 In its most extended analysis of the commerce clause problem, the majority notes:
"The claim that the Detroit ordinance •.. imposes ..• an undue burden on interstate
commerce needs no extended discussion. State regulation, based on the police power,
which does not discriminate against interstate commerce or operate to disrupt its required
uniformity may constitutionally stand." Principal case at 448.
s For other examples of this approach, see Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 388 (1932);
South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 190 (1938).
tl See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 76S (1945).
10 "[W]hen judicial theory is cast in conceptual terms that seek to avoid the weighing
of functional values, the result frequently is to obscure the judicial identification and
appraisal of the functional interests that lead to the conceptual characterization." KAUPER,
FRONTIERS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY 94 (1956).
11 If, on a preliminary consideration of the facts of a case, it is obvious to the Court
that the underlying functional considerations clearly require them to sustain or to invalidate a state regulation, it seems likely that the Court would save time by framing its
opinion in terse, conceptual language rather than writing a lengthy opinion containing an
exhaustive consideration of the functional values raised.
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Thus when attempting to predict the Court's position with respect to this
type of regulation, it seems better to assess the functional interests which
the Court has expressly or implicitly considered than to try to extract general rules of law from the conceptual language of the Court.
One of the important functional factors which the Court has expressly
considered in its written opinions12 is the existence or non-existence of
conflicting state regulations on the same subject.is It is questionable
whether this should be a determinative factor in deciding the constitutionality of a state regulation. If the mere existence of a conflict between
the laws of different states is a sufficient ground for invalidating a statute,
healthy innovation would be stifled and the later of two conflicting state
regulations would need to be invalidated.1 4 Furthermore, a court might
interpret "conflicting state regulations" to mean "conflicting state policies."
The regulations of two states would then be in conflict whenever one state
passed a positive regulation dealing with an area which the other state
chose to leave unregulated. Acceptance of this view would require that the
ordinance in the principal case be invalidated, for the record would show
conflicting state regulations although no other state was shown to have a
smoke control ordinance. A second functional factor which has influenced
the Court's decisions is the effect of the regulation on the free flow of
commerce. If state regulations merely increase the cost of engaging in
interstate commerce,15 the Court will be less likely to invalidate the regulation than if it actually restricts the physical flow of goods from one state to
another.16 Compliance with the smoke regulation in the principal case
would not restrict the free flow of goods across state lines but would
merely increase the cost of engaging in commerce17 by requiring the appellant to install a different type of boiler if he is to comply with th<:
ordinance. A third important functional factor which the Court has considered is the effectiveness of the regulation in achieving the goal which the
state is attempting to attain through the use of its police power.1 8 When
it is not clear that the regulation aids in achieving this goal, the Court is
more inclined to invalidate the regulation. For example, in invalidating a

12 See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, supra note 9; Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc.,
359 U.S. 520 (1959); principal case at 448.
13 For a discussion of the problems the Court has had in defining "conflict" between
a state and federal law, see The Supreme Court, 1959 Term, 74 HARv. L. R.Ev. 132 (1960)
14 See The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, 73 HARv. L. REv. 168 (1959).
15 See Sproles v. Binford, supra note 8; South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., supra note 8.
16 Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., supra note 12; Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madi•
son, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
17 The Court noted in Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 526 that
"cost taken into consideration with other factors might be relevant in some cases to the
issue of burden on commerce."
18 See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, supra note 9; Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, supra
note 12.
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maximum train length regulation in Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona19 the
Court expressed doubt that the regulation would increase safety by reducing
train accidents and employee injuries. Long trains are not, in themselves,
a recognized danger; railroad safety might be improved by operating a
small number of long trains rather than an increased number of short
trains. However, in the principal case, smoke is itself a recognized evil;
clearly limitations upon its density and duration help in attaining the
city's objective of reducing smoke. A fourth functional factor which the
Court has considered is the nature and extent of the interest which the
state is trying to protect by enacting the police power regulation. If it appears that the state is regulating some legitimate local interest, the Court
will be more inclined to uphold the enactment. For example, a state's
proprietary interest in the maintenance of its highways weighs heavily in
favor of laws regulating the use of those highways.20 In the principal case
it is clear that Detroit has a legitimate local interest in protecting its
inhabitants and their property from air pollution.
Apart from the factors which the Court has expressly considered, there
are other factors which courts should consider when passing upan the con•
stitutionality of state regulation of interstate commerce. Where compliance
with the regulation affects equipment use, courts should consider whether
the ordinance makes a specific requirement concerning the type of equipment to be used21 or whether it merely sets an objective standard of performance. ,;r\,7here the type of equipment is specified a carrier engaged in
interstate commerce may be forced to stop and change equipment if two
states have differing specific requirements.22 On the other hand, if an
objective standard of performance is defined, this standard may be met by
the use of various types of equipment and would leave the affected carrier
free to move between all states without equipment changeover so long as
it met the most stringent standard. Such an objective standard existed in
the principal case, for the ordinance set maximum limits on the density
and duration of smoke. Thus, a carrier would be free to choose his equipment and operate in all states, without equipment changeover, simply by
conforming to the most stringent smoke ordinance. Among other functional
factors which the courts might consider are the extraterritorial effect of
the state regulation, the economic effect on the industry most directly
affected, and the likelihood of congressional action to alleviate burdens
imposed by local laws. The importance of the latter factor can be seen in
the principal case. Since Congress has expressly recognized air pollution
19 !!25
20 See

U.S. 761, 776-79.
South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., supra note 8.
21 For example, the Illinois statute in Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., supra note
12, specified the type of mudguard which was required to be used on trucks using the
state's highways.
22 This was the situation in Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., supra note 12, for
Illinois and Arkansas each required a different type of mudguard to be used.
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as a matter of local concem,2 3 it is not likely to pass a uniform smoke
control law. Thus an invalidation of this smoke ordinance would have
meant that there could be no effective smoke regulation in Detroit. The
Court properly avoided this result.
John M. Niehuss

23

S. REP. No. 389, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1955).

